no matter what you set it to, it is always reasonable that it will become worth enough to be prohibitive. Or you could try changing it to an amount which is a like 0.0001 (1 basis pt) or less of the reserve itself, or maybe 1% of the quantity requested? Open to ideas.
Honestly, i think a better approach might be to refund the honey whenever the proposal is passed or withdrawn. Possibly with a tax.
To summarize. Logic would look like:
in order to submit a proposal, require deposit of h honey as a function of the proposal itself, eg h = .01*r where r is the quantity of funds requested.
if the proposal is veto’d (by a court action) sacrifice those funds to the DAO.
if the proposal is withdrawn (by the submitter) you get say 0.90*h back (implies a 10% tax for taking our attention)
if the proposal passes, then you return h to the proposer.
Just brainstorming, I’ve spent some time thinking about a range of policies on the interfaces to the conviction voting algorithm. I understand you may just want to reduce the fee as a quick fix to improve usability now.