Incentivaze governance with $Honey token

Yesterday I put up a proposal regarding artciles/tutorials about Honey. For few minutes I was look at the proposal and I saw one contract address add 1,000 honey, remove 800, add 50, remove 100 and so on.
Which always changed the countdown and this was a very weird exprerience.

I think there should be some regulations regarding voting, some resetrictions and/or rewards. One of the incentives that I came up with is the following (I’ll be throwing random numbers and %-s):
Let’s say I put up a proposal and am asking for 10 honey tokens and let’s say thresh hold is 20 honey tokens, with 5 people voting, each with 4 honey tokens (20% of the vote). When the proposal passes and gets executed 10% of the $Honey taken out of the common pool should be distributed among the voters. In this case, each will get 0.2 $Honey tokens for taking part in governance.
But they should only receive honey tokens if they followed through at the end, i.e. if they still have Honey staked on that specific proposal, they get share of the reward.

There is one problem, and I’m sure this model needs quite some polishing, but we will get people voting with $Honey and then taking out $Honey again. Or maybe getting into the proposals at the last second with huge amount of Honey. For this, I think we can use some type of time based reward system.
Let’s take the same example - 10 Honey will be taken out of pool, 20 Honey is needed, 5 people are voting each with 20% (4 Honey). The vote ends on September 22 00:00. Proposal was put up on September 21 00:00. That means the proposal must be bassed/rejected in 24 hours time.
If some whale votes at the last second, his returns from the Honey reward will be a lot less than for others who aren’t whales, because for each minute that passes from proposal being put up to the deadline, your return diminishes. For example - If I’ve 100% of the vote and I voted at the beginning on the proposal, I get 100% of the reward (in this case I said 10% of Honey that will be taken out of the common pool), but if I vote in the middle of the process, e.g. 12 hours have passed, my reward diminishes by 50%.

Another thing, but not regarding the above, my proposal was going to be executed but, for some reason, the countdown reset. Probably because someone who voted took out their Honey.
I think a fix for this would be - if a proposal passes the thresh hold and it becomes executable, it shouldn’t matter if someone takes out their Honey, the proposal was executable and it should stay so.

I’m just throwing out ideas. There might be something in this.

Let me know what you guys think. Want to discuss the ideas I’ve thrown around here before I put up a proposal
.
:honeybee::honeybee::honeybee:

3 Likes

I think the main problem for 1Hive governance is stability. People can vote, instantly unvote, if you’re not fast enough to execute the timer could reset.

There should be some incentives for people who vote with their $Honey tokens.

3 Likes

It was me who voted with my full support and later realized that I was voting with much more honey than the rest, and that felt unfair, so I unstaked most of my honey.

I’m sorry if that felt weird, my intention just the contrary, not to take advantage of my position of honey early holder by putting so much honey on stake meanwhile it is still concentrated in few hands.

I hope we will be able to fix that when honey is more distributed and we implement quadratic conviction voting, so the differences between large and small honey tokenholders will hopefully be smoother.

I propose that instead of stimulate governance with honey, at least for the moment. Beeing part of the community :honeybee: and deciding together what to do with the common funds is enough incentive I think.

Moreover, I also think that it’s a weird experience to see a proposal that has passed and suddenly see how it still needs more conviction. There is not an easy solution for that, because it’s not only conviction that grows or declines, the threshold can also change based on the pool holdings. We can force execution when withdrawing tokens from a proposal that is ready to pass, but there is still that case in which a proposal is ready to pass and suddenly the threshold increases because another proposal has been executed and there are less funds in the pool now. Making sure that all proposals pass in order could lead to out of gas errors (and out of gas attacks), and I don’t think it will be solved in the short term, but we can at least impede withdrawing without execution which is the problem you encountered.

2 Likes

That makes sense.

I’ve executed one proposal on 1Hive, other than the execution button being bugged, it was overall a pretty good experience.
But from what I can see, many people are accumilating Honey tokens for the sake of selling it later. Incentivizing people to actually use their honey on proposals, instead of having it sitting in their wallets, will drive activity further and I think that’s a good thing. For example - I put up a proposal for 10 Honey and 2 people vote on it. If it passes, 2% of 10 Honey - 0.2 Honey - will be distributed amongst the 2 voters, 0.1 each.

3 Likes