So, after todayās pollen distribution turned into a hot mess, I have taken it upon myself to come up with a list of changes that can be applied to Discordās distribution system in order to make it fairer, more transparent and more difficult to game by bad actors.
I am going to split those suggestions into 2 categories, Technical changes (changes done to the system itself) and Organisatorial changes (changes done to the process of spotting and punishing the bad actors who manage to game the system)
In order to come up with solutions, we must first take a look and see where the problem lies, more specifically, how did the bad actors manage to cheat the system?
I.Technical Changes
Problem 1: Multiple accounts
Problem description: One pattern that was pretty noticeable among most cheaters, was the use of alternate accounts, or āaltsā . Although BrightID is supposed to solve this problem, I think we can all agree getting a few friends or family members to verify a few accounts isnāt that hard. And given the fact there is a pretty substantial financial reward at stake, I think the cheaters wonāt lack the motivation to do just that.
Solution: Implement a system similar to the merit system on Bitcointalk. On Bitcointalk, there is a merit system in place where an user has to accumulate a certain amount of merit in order to improve his trust level and unlock new features. They have a few members that have the ability to give merit ( merit source) who are mostly established members of the community and they are the only ones allowed to give it away. So how can we implement that on discord?
I propose that all new verified users on discord start without the ability to mint cred. After they receive an arbitrary amount of cred from one of the verified cred sources ( we can give Fauna and the Seeds this role) they can start minting cred on their own. In parallel to that we can also cap the cred level new users can mint on a time-based system.
So, until verified by a cred source, no cred minted. One week after being verified, a cap of 40 cred per week. After two weeks a cap of 80 and then after 3 weeks they become fully verified users and the cap is removed. The numbers are of course arbitrary and used only as an example, details can be worked upon later.
Problem 2: The Holy League of reactions trading
Problem description: āGangsā of bad Bees have formed with the sole purpose of reacting to eachotherās post, essentially a like4like agreement between them.
Solution: Implement an asymptotic system similar to the one implemented for multiple reactions on a post ( A reacts to B one time: 1x cred. , second time 0.95x, third time 0.90xā¦)
Also, have it visible on the SourceCred ledger, to whom did that user react the most and who reacted to him the most, similar to the feature on discourse ( Most liked byā¦). This could make it more transparent and easier to identify people trying to cheat.
II.Organisatorial changes
Problem: No way to punish the Bad Hombres
Problem description: Bad actors are identified, but since there is no āofficialā way to report them, this turns into a mess of singling out users, witch hunts and mobs demanding justice across all 1Hive platforms.
Solution: Create a framework for reporting bad behaviour to the DAO members and make the process as transparent as possible. The users doing the reporting must prove beyond resonable doubt that someone is cheating and the DAO members must take the decision to deactivate that account unanimously and with no one being granted a Veto. I agree with Luke here and see no point in making the community vote on issues like that.
I would like to hear your thoughts on this and hopefully we can work this out together to avoid the same mess happening every week.