1Hive Harvest🌼 - Season 1

[paul]

1Hive Harvest - Season 1

Proposal Information

Proposal Link:
https://gardensdao.eth.limo/#/xdai/garden/0x8ccbeab14b5ac4a431fffc39f4bec4089020a155/proposal/107

Proposal description:
This proposal is to fund the first season of 1Hive Harvest - a seasonal celebration of work done by the 1Hive DAO, where contributors show how their work created shared value, and 1Hive shows its appreciation by streaming dat sweet, sweet Honey.

DETAILS PLS!

• Timeframe: rewarding value created between May 18, 2022 and August 18, 2022.
• Any swarm, working group, or individual can apply for Harvest Funding by creating a Signaling Proposal in the 1Hive Garden that links to a forum post showing work they’ve done during the time period, and how it created value for 1Hive.
• A snapshot of relative conviction for Harvest Funding proposals will be taken on August 18, 2022 at 19:00 UTC.
• The retroactive funding multisig will then set up HNY streams that vest over a 12-month period based on signaling proposal results.
• Harvest Funding recipients are free to distribute HNY streams among themselves in the way they think is best. A popular option used in the Pilot was with Coordinape.
• Proposals will use a Harvest Application Template similar to what was used in the Pilot. One update with the Season 1 application will be an expanded report on treasury, so we can better track budgets, funding sources, expenses, and working group treasuries across all contributors to the DAO.

In the Retroactive Funding Pilot, there were 6 applications that received a total of 77.5 HNY. Here’s the breakdown of where that HNY went:

• Gardens - 6.22% conviction - 37.66 HNY
• Quests - 1.50% conviction - 9.08 HNY.
• NFBeez - 1.37% conviction - 8.29 HNY
• Blossom Labs - 1.35% conviction - 8.17 HNY
• Treasury - 0.91% conviction - 5.51 HNY
• Buzz - 0.83% conviction - 5.02 HNY

In a follow-up poll in the forum, 80% of 1Hivers said “Hell Yeah” we should expand Retroactive Funding. Based on consensus in the forum, we are requesting 20% of the current Common Pool (1,575 HNY), split over 5 funding proposals, to fund this season.

The Pilot program showed that in a short period of time and for a relatively small amount of HNY, 1Hive’s swarms could put together data and examples that told a decent story of the value they created. However with much more time and much more HNY on the line in Season 1, we should raise our expectations for what constitutes a good proposal, and for what constitutes valuable work at 1Hive (forum post on improving from our Pilot).

Proposal Rationale
1Hive Harvest at this funding level has the ability to kickstart our DAO’s growth by giving contributors due recognition and compensation for their achievements. It can also evolve our governance “brain” so that voting weight flows towards current contributors, allowing the DAO to evolve and self-improve.

In a time when many projects in this space have uncertain futures, 1Hive is lucky to have an extremely well-built economic system that will most likely outlive any of its current contributors. 1Hive Harvest can help us not only survive this down market, but thrive.

Why is Retroactive Funding a good idea?

• Value is easier to measure after it’s created. 1Hive can be more confident that HNY is being well spent compared to funding proposals that compensate work in the future.
• Better accountability and feedback. The community gets a more direct feedback system for signaling what it wants to see more of.
• Rewarding the right contributor mindset. The mindset that does best in this system is “what can we / I do that creates the most value for 1Hive?” The more competent people we have thinking this way, the more value we’ll create🧐
• Incentivizing long term growth. Compensating with vesting tokens means that swarms and contributors are financially linked to long term growth in the price of HNY.
• Improving DAO Governance In order for the cybernetic organism of 1Hive to self-improve, governance weight should flow in the direction of contributors currently creating the most value.

Expected duration or delivery date (if applicable):
August 18, 2022, 19:00 UTC - snapshot taken of Harvest proposals. Vesting streams will be set up shortly after.

Team Information (For Funding Proposals)

Multisig signers:

• @gabi
• @Gossman123
• @mrtdlgc
• @kamikazebr
• @eenti
• @Rohekbenitez
• @paul
• @rperez89
• @solarmkd
• @twells

Skills and previous experience in related or similar work:
Same Gnosis Safe / signers from the Retroactive Funding Pilot

Funding Information

Amount of HNY requested:
1,575 HNY (split into 5 funding proposals)

This is 20% of the Common Pool, the amount agreed on in this forum poll, on June 27, 2022 (date of proposal 1 of 5).

Ethereum address where funds shall be transferred:
0xe6a1b6B98dc978888b0c83DbA2D5fabcF5069312

Gnosis Safe, 4 of 10 signers

More detailed description of how funds will be handled and used:
Funds will be held in the Gnosis Safe until Harvest is complete in August. Streams will be set up using the Vesting App if ready, otherwise we’ll use Superfluid like we did in the Pilot.

[Gossman123]

Hey Paul, this is really cool and I think it will incentive swarms to give the best value for 1hive. Just to make sure about the numbers :

• 1 season is 3 month
• end of the 3 month a stream is created to spread 20% of the common pool in 1 year (distributed in different swarms)
• next season will create another stream besides of the first one that will again spread 20% of the common pool in 1 year.

I just want to make sure because I think its a lot of HNY and if there is no mistake in what I wrote above, it will need 4x20% of the common pool in a year (4 trimesters)

[paul]

Your numbers are right yeah.

Yes the 20% Common Pool number isn’t sustainable we’ll need to lower that in future seasons. I think the value in starting so high is that there is a lot of HNY locked in wallets of inactive seeds right now, which doesn’t seem really healthy for our economy. As the Total Supply of HNY grows (and the price of HNY as well eventually), the % of Common Pool used for Harvest can get lower and lower and yet still grow in dollar value.

[DogeKing]

I would just suggest if community decides to go with this allocation for 3 months stream of HNY at least we need new fresh snapshot for everyone who applied for RF. Because some of the swarms/groups didnt had time to write on time application for RF and small % was redirected through signaling proposal for somevof the groups.So if decision was to use numbers from final snapshot from RF for harvest season 1 just my opinion is go with new snapshot where everyone who applied will make signal proposal at the same time.

[paul]

Yes for sure! Sorry if it wasn’t clear but there will be a new snapshot for this on August 18. Swarms/people will need to make new proposals to get funding.

Getting this proposal up well in advance so the working groups are motivated to work hard the next couple months and have plenty of time to get proposals together.

[kamikazebr]

@DogeKing Something we are doing in Gardens is each contributor write down in each sprint what have been done, so its more easy to review and check what have been done and what can be selected to express value created. Maybe that could be a good pattern to facilitate the process.

[ComandoBurrito]

Hi @kamikazebr I’m interesting in sharing what value we brought when we made HiveCraft last year if you give me opportunity to share our attributions from back then as one of past1Hive featured projects

[Challenger]

Dispute 7 Context

I’m the challenger in dispute 7. I wanted to provide more reasoning in the challenge, but the transaction failed with “Error: (Awaiting internal transactions for reason)”. I kept trying, reduced the argument length by picking one sentence from my argument introduction, and ultimately had to reduce the settlement offer from 0.32 HNY to 0.01 HNY for it to work, but the comment remained very short.

I assumed there would be an opportunity for more comments later on after the settlement phase. As it does not appear possible, I’m posting the full argument here, since the dispute directs to this forum thread.

Introduction

The 1Hive Harvest Season 1 already received an allocation of 315 HNY with proposal 107; seeking 1260 HNY more (in 4 proposals) seems too much. The proposal refers to “consensus in the forum” to justify “requesting 20% of the current Common Pool”. However, that was just a poll with 5 votes, and is not decisive. While I am sympathetic and grateful for Paul’s great work on the Harvest, I believe a consideration of the 1hive covenant’s policy requires the Harvest to remain smaller.

Policies

According to the 1Hive Community Covenant, “[t]he goal of the 1Hive protocol is to foster a healthy community economy by allocating a steady stream of Honey towards […] common goods” (emphasis added).

After a challenge to a funding request, according to the Celeste wiki, “Celeste attempts to find what the subjective truth is (i.e. the most broadly acceptable resolution of a dispute) with a Schelling game.”

Arguments

In order for the community economy to be healthy and the capacity of funding to be steady, the practice in the 1hive community has been to individually assess proposals and seek results with the potential to create a sustainable demand for Honey. (See the 1hive forum.)

It is unclear how disbursing 20% of the pool in these market conditions, for a 3-month period of limited activities, would foster the stated goal.
Some activities (e.g., Quests maintenance with proposal 108 and Buzz Swarm #6 with proposal 101) were already funded individually in this period, so rewards out of the Harvest Season may be duplicative.

The further value that may be created is speculative. A reward allocation is sought now, but there are no quantitative results to justify it. For the objective of a bonus with the Harvest, a smaller amount of HNY is more justifiable (and already funded).

The proposer may argue there is vesting over a year. This does not resolve the question whether this big allocation will create enough demand for Honey, and it still creates some selling pressure for a year.

There is also limited participation in governance at this time. Respectfully, this implies participants are likely to vote for their own work, with limited independent analysis of what created the most value. A bigger Harvest would make more sense in an environment with a lot of governance participation.

Conclusion

We cannot risk spending up to 20% of the current pool without further consideration of the impact on the economy. That is a deliberative matter that can be discussed on the forum and lead to proposals that more clearly identify a sustainable demand for Honey, while this case should be decided objectively on the criteria of the Covenant.

Blocking the allocation should be the most broadly acceptable resolution, because it is based on criteria of the Covenant calling for the economy to remain healthy and steady.

[paul]

I’ll write a more detailed post later about why I disagree that Harvest is requesting too much Honey, but for the sake of the Celeste dispute I want to get a quick post out about how this isn’t a good use of Celeste.

The disputer is asking the Celeste jury to make a subjective decision about whether this proposal is a good use of Honey - these conversations about whether a proposal is healthy for 1Hive should be taking place in the forum when the community is considering the proposal, guiding people’s decisions on whether or not to support it. Most proposals are considered “unhealthy” by some portion of the community, but proposals should only be blocked with Celeste for violations of the Covenant that represent abuse of the economy. Blocking this proposal would set a bad precedent that people can block any proposal simply because they disagree about the value the proposal brings

As far as the steady flow of Honey dictated in the Covenant, this is enforced by the parameters for conviction voting and dynamic issuance which throttle the spending of Honey. If people believe Honey is being distributed or minted too quickly or in too large of chunks, we should talk about adjusting the parameters to fix that, not disputing individual proposals with Celeste. Or if people think we shouldn’t allow multiple proposals to request funding for the same project, we should consider adding that as a restriction to the Covenant.

I do think our Covenant needs more work spelling out the types of proposals we don’t want to allow - hopefully this dispute motivates us to make it better.

[lkngtn]

@paul

The disputer is asking the Celeste jury to make a subjective decision about whether this proposal is a good use of Honey - these conversations about whether a proposal is healthy for 1Hive should be taking place in the forum when the community is considering the proposal, guiding people’s decisions on whether or not to support it. Most proposals are considered “unhealthy” by some portion of the community, but proposals should only be blocked with Celeste for violations of the Covenant that represent abuse of the economy.

I pretty much agree with this, however it’s still subjective whether a proposals like this would represent a violation of the covenant or not. We don’t yet have much in the way of precedent to point to, but by disputing this case, discussing the merits of both sides, and ultimately having some resolution through Celeste it will have improved the clarity of the Covenant and can move on from there.

Personally, I think the strongest case for blocking this proposal may actually not be what is brought up by the challenger (essentially arguing that it’s not effective and too risky to allocate that much of the common pool to this experiment), but instead the following point brought up by @paul here:

@paul

As far as the steady flow of Honey dictated in the Covenant, this is enforced by the parameters for conviction voting and dynamic issuance which throttle the spending of Honey. If people believe Honey is being distributed or minted too quickly or in too large of chunks, we should talk about adjusting the parameters to fix that, not disputing individual proposals with Celeste. Or if people think we shouldn’t allow multiple proposals to request funding for the same project, we should consider adding that as a restriction to the Covenant.

Essentially we use the conviction voting mechanism to regulate the flow of funds out of the common pool, and if necessary we could adjust the the parameters through governance if we think that the mechanism needs to be re-tuned. However, one of the interesting dynamics of the mechanism is that the larger a share of the common pool a proposal requests, the greater the conviction needed to pass that proposal becomes, and this relationship is deliberately non-linear, so as the percent of funding requested increases it quickly becomes essentially impossible to pass a proposal even if you were to somehow get 100% of conviction behind it. This pressure is presumably why the Harvest proposals got split into multiple proposals, it circumvents the non-linearity imposed by conviction voting on requesting large amounts by simply making multiple proposals for smaller amounts and lumping them together after they pass.

I think a strong argument could be made that this is a violation because its circumventing an important aspect of the conviction voting mechanism.

In the past we have seen similar situations, for example swarms often make proposals periodically for relatively small amounts. However, in those cases they are performing work towards some project and then after some work and time has passed submitting another proposal to continue the work. I think that is a fairly reasonable approach, and to a certain degree adds accountability since future proposals might be less likely to pass if current work doesn’t meet expectations… In this case however, all the funds from the 5 proposals would be used together as one big pool and it feels much harder to justify not using a single larger proposal.

@paul

I do think our Covenant needs more work spelling out the types of proposals we don’t want to allow - hopefully this dispute motivates us to make it better.

I think it would be a very beneficial exercise for the community to work on re-drafting the covenant now that we have more experience and have some experience with Celeste in practice.

[paul]

I appealed the ruling in Celeste that blocked this proposal - it’s currently in another voting period. I believe the proposal should be allowed, and that this line in the Covenant is most relevant for the case:

Participants in the dispute resolution protocol are expected to review the proposal, this covenant, and related past disputes in order to provide a judgement that they feel best aligns with the established norms and intention of the 1Hive community.

It’s an established norm in the 1Hive community that when a funding proposal needs more money than can be requested in 1 proposal because of the spending limit, separate funding proposals are created:

• Shapeshift Shared Liquidity
• BrightID Shared Liquidity
• Water Shared Liquidity
• Honeyswap Hack Reimbursement

Proposals are independent of each other, so community members can support a first proposal but abstain from later funding proposals if they feel too much HNY is being requested.

These proposals all passed without a dispute, so if we’re going to start prohibiting them, we should agree to that as a community and add it to the Covenant (a conversation I’ve started here).

Separate from the Celeste dispute, I think there are some important points to address in @Challenger’s post:

There is also limited participation in governance at this time… A bigger Harvest would make more sense in an environment with a lot of governance participation.

This touches on maybe the most important benefit of a large Harvest for the 1Hive community. Right now, a very large chunk of HNY is sitting in wallets of inactive early builders that are no longer contributing to 1Hive, and as that Honey sits idle, others are actively building and maintaining 1Hive and struggling to get enough governance participation for proposals as critical as fixing a bug that made HNY non-transferrable.

Our payment system should both address both the value being created today from work done a long time ago, and move Honey towards currently active contributors so governance can remain active, healthy, and capable of adapting to the ever-changing web3 landscape.

That said, early contributors who took outsized risk in contributing to 1Hive should get outsized returns for that risk - and 1Hive Harvest is a very good way to do this. I very intentionally worded this proposal so that 1Hive Harvest isn’t rewarding work done in a time period, but value created, meaning it can reward work that was done a long time ago if it’s still creating value today.

By measuring this value in a seasonal ritual like Harvest, the community gets a chance to come together and look at:

• What have we built that’s creating the most value today?
• Who created that value?

This is a chance for key early 1Hive contributors to share the work that did that current contributors are standing on the shoulders of (and might not have context for), and for those early contributors to keep getting rewarded for that work for as long as it’s creating value.

That said, the community isn’t incentivized to reward inactive contributors if they feel like they’re not going to contribute again in the future, since that Honey will probably just sit idle. This is why the Retroactive Funding Pilot application asked about work completed during the time period as well, so the community can get a sense for how active the applicant is and how likely they are to keep building.

Some activities (e.g., Quests maintenance with proposal 108 and Buzz Swarm #6 with proposal 101) were already funded individually in this period, so rewards out of the Harvest Season may be duplicative.

Ideally Harvest is a substantial amount of HNY that’s reliable enough that swarms feel comfortable reducing their up-front pay and are more keen on doing work they think the community will find most valuable. We’re already doing this at the Gardens swarm with Basic Income. The Fluid Proposals project looks very promising for funding ongoing/future work at 1Hive as well.

I don’t think Harvest will ever replace the need for funding proposals for up-front payment. This is why the Harvest application asks for a treasury report from swarms on income they’re getting both from 1Hive funding proposals and outside sources - so the community can factor that into their voting for retroactive funding so they’re not duplicative.

To wrap this up:

Harvest, in combination with Fluid Proposals, has the potential to be an enormous improvement on how 1Hive compensates contributors, but because we’re competing against VC-funded web3 organizations or DAOs with much larger treasuries with the work being funded, it needs a lot of Honey to be meaningful for contributors.

If we stop Harvest at just 1 proposal for 315 HNY, this will only represent a ~$15k incentive spread across 7+ working groups and dozens of active contributors. That amount is unlikely to do much to retain our top contributors, or to tip the balances of governance health away from our HNY being locked in mothballed wallets.

This compensation transition is a heavy lift that involves risk and some trial and error, but based on the support I’ve heard for this proposal in our Discord from active contributors, I’m extremely confident it is worth investing the large portion of the Common Pool that’s being asked for.

[Challenger]

I appreciate the Harvest more with this great explanation. However, I think this can be achieved more moderately, and the appeal is based on an incorrect interpretation of norms and intentions of 1Hive.

Separate Proposals Are Not A Norm; The Proposer Broke Down The Total Amount To Avoid The Required Conviction (Not The Spending Limit Only)

Separate funding proposals have been a practice (with liquidity projects only; the second proposal for the Honeyswap recovery came after the exact amount became known) which has not been challenged and is not a settled question nor an established norm.

If you want an analogy, imagine a traffic norm that stop signs require a three-second stop. Just because transgressions were not caught or enforced, does not mean there cannot be enforcement in the future. (Kleros published an extensive blog post on the presence of enforcement after a cat made it to a doge list.) It does not make passing through stop signs in less than three seconds a norm either even if a large part of the community practices it.

The proposer mentions the spending limit as the justification why separate funding proposals could be created. According to the Gardens wiki, “the Spending Limit in a single proposal is 10% of the Common Pool.” The proposer seeks 20%, but is breaking this down in five proposals instead of two. The effect is reducing the conviction required for the proposals. This is the biggest concern Luke is observing. With this line of thinking, the “judgement that … best aligns with the established norms and intention” (embodied in the garden parameters) would still be blocking the action despite the appellant’s argument.

Because this action space is not explicitly forbidden in the Covenant as the proposer argues, I prefer challenging because of the intention with the economy.

The Intention Is A Steady And Healthy Economy; Honey Can Already Be Distributed Sufficiently To Interested, Productive Members

Even though “Harvest isn’t rewarding work done in a time period, but value created”, it remains limited in both cases in terms of adoption. The reality is that there is very little use of Gardens, Celeste and Quests, which are common goods worth funding in the long term. Work for “adapting to the ever-changing web3 landscape” will still be able to be funded by not flooding the circulating supply with too many bonuses in this time of bear market and low demand.

The case I’m making is for results that justify the amounts allocated rather than speculation of results when making a poll for an upcoming Harvest percentage, and rather than 1575 HNY in bonuses now for the sake of “outsized returns” for “early contributors”. If the amount in the Harvest is not enough, swarms or other contributors that achieve more are welcome to justify requests for additional Honey rather than get arbitrary sums. Indeed, the recent retroactive funding of Quests proves this can be done, and a new upfront proposal for Quests is being discussed.

Over time, it is still possible to reward active contributors sufficiently and increase governance participation again, whereas the proposer recognizes “risk and some trial and error” in this big Harvest and does not demonstrate urgency. One of the very reasons of Celeste is to protect, in accordance with the Covenant, “mothballed wallets”; they do not necessarily deserve being diluted rapidly and getting stuck in a risky economy, unless the proposals provably “bring the most value to the 1Hive community”.

A significant increase of the circulating supply for these bonuses may decrease faith in Honey by long-time holders and current buyers, and undermine the whole goal of an economy that can fund projects such as Gardens, Celeste and Quests in the long run.

[paul]

I agree the practice of splitting proposals is not a settled question. Distinguishing a “practice” from a “norm” doesn’t help us much here though. If a practice is done frequently enough, it’s a norm - even if it’s cars rolling through stop signs.

The Honeyswap reimbursement proposal wound up needing 500 HNY to pass - in 1 proposal that would’ve needed 18% support, which 1Hive hasn’t reached on a funding proposal in over a year. The reality was that in order for the proposal to pass it needed to be split into 2 proposals.

Our job is to look at cases like this where norms are going against designed intent and then solve those contradictions through governance. In the case of the Honeyswap hack, the users were very happy that there was a precedent for splitting proposals that let them get all their money back. If we ban this practice without an alternative, we severely handicap what this DAO is capable of doing. A couple of governance solutions we can consider are increasing the spending limit, or adopting the Aragon Tao Voting Demo under construction to allow funding requests through Decision Votes.

At this point the Celeste Dispute has succeeded in delaying this proposal enough that it won’t be possible for 1575 HNY to be raised by the August 18 snapshot - and if other supporters agree, I’d be OK foregoing proposals 3 through 5 given the concerns.

In the dispute appeal, I hope the Celeste Jury chooses to allow this proposal as the only means with precedent that we have for funding larger projects, and I hope the community is motivated to agree on a real solution to the issue. The Covenant update and the 1Hive Essential Intent follow-up call tomorrow are good starting points for that conversation.

[paul]

The snapshot for 1Hive Harvest Season 1 is coming up on August 18, but if you plan on applying for funding, you should aim to have your proposals up in 1Hive no later than August 10 - 1 week from now! This will give the community enough time to read the proposal, vote, and for conviction to grow. The earlier the better!

Here is how to apply for Harvest (template modified from the Retroactive Funding Pilot):

---

HOW TO APPLY FOR 1HIVE HARVEST SEASON 1

1. Create a forum post in the Proposals category of the Forum .

Use this framework for your application.

• Swarm, working group, or contributor name:

• If applying as a swarm or working group, who helped with this application? So we know who put this together… this doesn’t need to be all active contributors.

• Description of value created for 1Hive, 18 May - 18 August, 2022: Show us how your work added value to the 1Hive community and the Honey token during this time period. This can (and probably will) be the result of work that was done before that. For the purpose of Harvest, the community is interested in compensating work based on the value it created, not the work itself. Helpful hints:

  • Don’t talk about potential future value! Example: “the app we built will let DAOs coordinate better…” = No! Retroactive funding means we only care about value that’s already been realized.
  • Whenever possible, use objective data rather than subjective statements. Example: “During the time period our tweets had 100k impressions, 3k clicks…” is much better than “our Twitter posts created a lot of excitement…”
  • Value created this time period can be from work done a long time ago. Example: Honeyswap was built thousands of years ago in crypto time but is still creating a lot of value for 1Hive today. People should know that if they do work that benefits 1Hive a long time from now, they can still be rewarded. That said, it’s not in 1Hive’s interest to give funding to inactive contributors if they don’t think they’ll come back.

• Description of work completed 18 May - 18 August, 2022: What work was done during this time period? Even though Harvest isn’t for compensating work completed, it’s relevant for the community to see the work being done.

• Financials - list the following information for the time period 18 May, 2022 to 18 August, 2022

  • Revenue - How much HNY did you receive from 1Hive Funding Proposals?
  • Revenue - How much money did you receive from outside sources? List the funding source (i.e. Gitcoin Grant, Giveth donations, product revenue) and the amount for each.
  • Expense - Contributor compensation. List all contributors that were paid during the time period and the amount they were paid.
  • Expense - Any other expenses outside of contributor compensation
  • Projected Expenses - Your expected expenses over the next 6 months, broken down month-to-month. How much of this do expect to raise from 1Hive funding proposals?
  • Treasury - (for swarms) list all funds currently held by the working group, with amounts for each token held.

• Gnosis Safe or Wallet address funds will go to:

• Plans for how funds will be distributed: Coordinape? Even split? All to one contributor? Will inactive contributors get funding? Context for your thought process that will give voters confidence funding will be distributed well.

2. Create a Signaling Proposal linking to your forum post.

• Conviction Growth for 1Hive is 2 days, and the proposal snapshot is August 18. Give the community enough time to read your proposal, vote, and for conviction to grow in time for the snapshot.

[paul]

Suggestions for voting on Harvest proposals:

• Conviction Growth at 1Hive has a 48 hour half life. Don’t wait until the last minute to vote or your voting weight will be super small.

• Keep checking in after you add your support to see how results are changing. You can always adjust your support to add to proposals you think are under-appreciated or withdraw support from proposals you think are getting too much love.

• Don’t self-enrich. Supporting your own proposals to get more funding for yourself is the easiest way to make the community less interested in funding Harvest in the future. The more your votes represent true value created in the community, the more sense it makes for the community to invest more in future Harvest seasons.

[paul]

Final results for Harvest Season 1:

Proposer	% Conviction	% of Harvest Funds Earned
Gardens Swarm	5.72%	43.60%
Buzz Swarm	3.68%	28.05%
Quests Swarm	2.11%	16.08%
Treasury Swarm	1.61%	12.27%

Streams will be set up after the outcome of Celeste Dispute #7 is decided.

Congratulations beez!

[Challenger]

I added an update regarding Celeste and this dispute in the August 2022 update draft. Feel free to comment or suggest edits there.

On August 30, 2022, the Celeste court executed a ruling in Dispute #7 blocking the second proposal to collect funds for the 1Hive Harvest Season 1. In the fifth and final round due to a limitation on appeals, 71% of the votes by drawn Celeste keepers were to block the action. The dispute had been created on July 22, 2022.

The key issue that stood out in Discord chats was that proposal splitting bypassed how conviction voting works, and the Covenant required keepers to enforce the intention to use this mechanism. The challenger also argued that, in the circumstances, the ultimate funding goal would impede the intention to foster a healthy community economy.

The proposer answered that proposal splitting is not expressly prohibited by the Covenant and had not been challenged in the past. The proposer also argued that the funding goal is healthy and necessary to encourage contributions and governance participation.

This dispute prompted the 1Hive community to start redrafting the Covenant and reconsidering parameters for the DAO and Celeste. Potential improvements of Celeste were also observed. To these ends, we would encourage everybody to share their thoughts on these matters.

[paul]

Harvest Season 1 Streams are up and running!

Since all the recipients are already getting Retroactive Funding from the Pilot, no new streams were set up - instead the existing streams were modified so the current streaming rates include the Pilot + Harvest Season 1.

We’ll modify the streams again on November 22 when streams for the Pilot are done, ending those streams. Unfortunately Superfluid doesn’t allow End Dates on streams yet, which is why we need to do these manually.

This spreadsheet shows the numbers for this distribution: Harvest Season 1 Distribution - Google Sheets

And here is the Gnosis Safe wallet for 1Hive Harvest: Safe

Applicant	Conviction	% Total	HNY	Current monthly stream	x12	Total Stream (until 22 November)	Wallet
Gardens Swarm	5.72%	43.60%	137.34	6.2767	75.3204	212.6604	0x1B8C7f06F537711A7CAf6770051A43B4F3E69A7e
Buzz Swarm	3.68%	28.05%	88.3575	0.8367	10.0404	98.3979	0x6E5318F562318be37f405539b14f57Dda4cEf3C7
Quests Swarm	2.11%	16.08%	50.652	1.5133	18.1596	68.8116	0xfc948259da24e372460Faf422d14aD9c79cc0f37
Treasury Swarm	1.61%	12.27%	38.6505	0.9183	11.0196	49.6701	0x47Aa2DF36e30ADa9f8Ceee54b3C8a60FD4787706